DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 475 616 SO 034 786

TITLE	Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.
INSTITUTION	Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.
PUB DATE	2003-00-00
NOTE	22p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Brown University, Choices for the 21st Century Education Project, Watson Institute, 111 Thayer Street, Box 1970, Providence, RI 02912. Tel: 401-863-2809; Web site: http://www.choices.edu/ .
PUB TYPE	Guides - Classroom - Teacher (052)
EDRS PRICE	EDRS Price MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS
DESCRIPTORS	Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; *International Relations; Mass Media Use; *Nuclear Weapons; Secondary Education; Social Studies
IDENTIFIERS	Historical Background; *North Korea; *Policy Issues

ABSTRACT

In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit California. Although Iraq has dominated much of the news during this same time period, the United States was also discussing the possible responses to North Korea. This lesson explores a range of contrasting policy options. It is designed to help teachers engage their secondary students in consideration of this important international issue. The lesson includes: background reading (offering a brief summary of the U.S.-North Korean relationship from the close of World War II to the present); policy options (designed to help students think about divergent policy alternatives, each with pros and cons, risks and tradeoffs); and a lesson plan (offering a suggested lesson plan). Lists additional resources and related curriculum units. (BT)

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Teaching with the News:

North Korea and Nuclear Weapons



SO 034 786

Choices for the 21st Century Program

A Program of the Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies

Brown University

2003 http://www.choices.edu/twtn.cfm?id=40

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CHOICES engages students at the secondary level in international issues and contributes to a renewal of civic engagement among young people in the United States. Choices' curricular resources and instructional programs bring international public policy issues to life.

CHOICES is a program of the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, Rhode Island, 02912 401-863-3155. choices@brown.edu

2003

Teaching with the News

North Korea and Nuclear Weapons

In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit California. In the 1994 agreement, North Korea had promised to halt its nuclear program in exchange for a U.S. commitment to assist North Korea in its energy needs.

Although Iraq currently dominates much of the news, the United States has begun to discuss the possible responses to North Korea. This lesson, which explores a range of contrasting policy options, has been developed by the Choices for the 21st Century Education Program at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies. It is designed to help teachers to engage their students in consideration of this important international issue.

The Choices Program has been built on a belief in the responsibility - not just the right - of all citizens in a democracy to voice their opinions and be heard. Inherent in this belief is a commitment to informed, reasoned, and respectful dialogue among people who hold differing perspectives on the issues of the day.

As we weigh our policy options, students should consider some fundamental questions.

- What are the consequences for the United States if North Korea begins producing more nuclear weapons?
- What are the consequences for the world?
- Why is North Korea doing this now?
- What should U.S. policy be toward North Korea?
- What role should the United States play in the world today?

This lesson includes:

- **Background Reading** *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons* offers a brief summary of U.S. - North Korean relations from the close of World War II to the present.

- **Policy Options:** The format of alternative policy directions that appears at the heart of every Choices curriculum unit is designed to help students to think about divergent policy alternatives, each driven by different underlying values, each with pros and cons, risks and tradeoffs. We have applied this approach to the current situation with North Korea.

- **Lesson Plan:** A suggested lesson plan is provided.

Additional Resources

1994 Agreed Framework The Arms Control Association web site offers a complete text of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Attached and at http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af.asp?print

North Korea: Nuclear Standoff This PBS site (NewsHour with Jim Lehrer) includes links to a series of background pieces on the subject. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/northkorea/

Let us hear from you: We would love to hear how you are using this curricular material. Send us an email at choices@brown.edu. Your input can help us when developing materials in the future.

Related Curriculum Units

- Responding to Terrorism: The Challenges for Democracy
- The Cuban Missile Crisis: Considering its Place in Cold War History
- The International System in the 21st Century: Considering the U.S. Role

North Korea and Nuclear Weapons – Background Reading

What is North Korea like today?

North Korea today is one of the most impoverished, isolated societies on earth. Some estimate that as many as two million North Koreans starved to death between 1995 and 1998 after a series of floods. Estimates are that out of a population of twenty-two million, thirteen million North Koreans are suffering from malnutrition. Sixty percent of all North Korean children are malnourished—the highest level in the world. Nevertheless, North Korea has one million soldiers in its military, many of whom are poised along the border with South Korea. North Korea is one of the most highly militarized countries in the world. In 2001, North Korea spent more than 30 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the military. Nearly eight thousand North Korean artillery pieces are along the border, many within range of the South Korean capital of Seoul.

North Koreans are isolated from the rest of the world by an extremely repressive state. For example, when the United States provided 500,000 tons of food aid in 2001, the North Korean government told its people that the food was provided as a form of tribute to their powerful country. North Koreans are forbidden to have any contact with the world outside of North Korea by mail, telephone, internet, or radio. Today, North Korea seems incomprehensible to most Americans.

Why is this communist totalitarian state threatening us? What is the history of relations between our countries? The story of our relations with North Korea begins at end of the Second World War.

Why was Korea divided in two?

In 1910, Japan annexed and occupied Korea. At the end of World War II, the Japanese forces in Korea surrendered to the Americans in the South and to the Soviets in the North. A line of demarcation between the two regions was created by the superpowers. This line divided the country in two—a communist North and a capitalist South.

As tensions between the Soviets and the United States heated up and the Cold War began, the division of North Korea became an issue for national security. The United States installed a hard-line anti-communist regime in

the South. In the North, the Soviets installed Kim Il Sung, a staunch communist who had lived in the Soviet Union during World War II.

How did the Korean War begin?

Kim Il Sung hoped to reunify the two Koreas by conquering the South, and he sought permission to invade from the Soviet leader Josef Stalin. Stalin agreed, and on June 25, 1950, the North launched an invasion backed by Soviet equipment and military advisors. The North Koreans captured Seoul in three days.

Why did the United States intervene in Korea?

For the United States these developments were a cause for great alarm. China had become a communist state and tensions with the Soviets in Europe were extremely high. President Truman believed the communist aggression needed to be checked wherever it occurred in the world. The United States and a coalition of nations under the auspices of the United Nations landed troops in South Korea, retook Seoul, and forced North Korean troops to retreat. Some UN troops reached the border of communist China. This advance triggered an attack by the Chinese, who said they would not allow North Korea to fall.

The Korean War lasted for another three years. Thirty-four thousand Americans died. More than three million Koreans were killed or wounded, and there were nine hundred thousand Chinese casualties. Although a truce was signed, no formal peace treaty was signed. The border between North and South Korea remained.

What was the outcome of the Korean War?

The 1953 truce agreement established a three-mile-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ). In fact, the border between the Koreas became a highly militarized area where each side faced the other down on a daily basis. Over the years, small scale fighting resulted in the deaths of over one thousand Koreans and forty-nine Americans. There were numerous efforts at infiltration, espionage, and provocation. The North Korean capture in 1968 of an intelligence-gathering ship, the U.S.S. Pueblo, and the murder of two American soldiers in 1976 as they attempted to cut down a tree in the DMZ heightened tensions nearly to the point of war.

How did the end of the Soviet Union affect North Korea?

The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of an era. For the United States, it meant the end of more than four decades of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. For North Korea, it meant that aid and support from the Soviet Union ceased. Starvation and hardship followed. North Korea sought to improve relations with the United States but was met with a cold shoulder due its repressive policies, its sponsorship of terrorism, and its radical ideology.

How did the United States and its allies respond to the North Korean nuclear program in the 1990s?

In the early 1990s, North Korea devoted increased resources to a nuclear weapons program. In 1993, they threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a treaty in which countries that do not have nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them. The United States began negotiations with North Korea in the hope of heading off the proliferation of nuclear weapons by a country we considered dangerous. After difficult negotiations, in 1994 (in what became known as the "Agreed Framework") the North Koreans agreed to shut down their missile development program and suspend construction of their graphite-moderated reactors that could produce weapons grade plutonium as a byproduct. In exchange, the United States made a commitment to take the lead in construction by 2003 of a light water reactor that would meet North Korea's energy needs (without producing weapons grade plutonium), and to provide energy and other forms of economic aid in the interim. Under the agreement North Korea could continue to produce nuclear energy in light water plants monitored by the IAEA. In addition, the United States agreed to begin to move towards normalization of political and economic relations between the two countries.

The 1994 Agreed Framework did not last. In 1999, the United States announced that the light water reactors would not be completed in 2003 as promised, but would be delayed until 2007 or 2008. North Korea threatened to resume its nuclear program if the 1994 agreement was not fulfilled. President Clinton later discussed a possible deal for assisting in the development of space launchers designed for commercial use only in exchange for further constraints on North Korea's missile program. When the Bush administration took office in 2001, discussions of a new missile agreement ended. North Korea imposed a unilateral moratorium on missile tests until 2003, but said it would not extend that unless a new agreement on missiles had been reached with the United States.

What did President Bush say about North Korea in his State of the Union Address?

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the security climate in Washington. Prior to September 11, President Bush had been less inclined to negotiate with North Korea than the Clinton administration had been. Following September 11, President Bush began to confront regimes he considered "evil" and a threat to U.S. security. North Korea fell into this category. In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, President George W. Bush condemned North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" (which included Iran and Iraq as well.) President Bush criticized the North Korean government for starving its citizens while threatening the world with missiles and weapons of mass destruction. He warned that he would not allow North Korea to threaten the United States. He cancelled work on the light water reactors and suspended energy assistance. Tensions between the two countries heated up once again.

What is the U.S. presence in South Korea now?

The United States maintains thirty-seven thousand troops in South Korea at a cost of one hundred million dollars per year. The troops are there to demonstrate a U.S. commitment to South Korean security. Many South Koreans have come to see U.S. policy as an obstacle to better relations with North Korea and many resent the presence of U.S. forces in their country.

What are the immediate causes of current concern about North Korea?

In the fall of 2002, North Korea stunned U.S. officials when they admitted that they had been continuing work on nuclear weapons program for years, in violating the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea expelled weapons monitors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), announced that they were beginning production of nuclear materials, and declared that they were withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Experts announced that, within a few months, North Korea would be able to produce one or two nuclear weapons per month. There is a concern that North Korea will sell its weapons to other states or to terrorists. North Korea is demanding direct negotiations with the United States, but refuses to sit down to talks until the United States proclaims that it will not engage in military action.

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North Korea and Nuclear Weapons - Policy Options

What follows is a framework of policy "Options" that address the current debate about North Korea. These options are designed to help you think about a range of possible policies and the ramifications of each.

The four options provided are not intended as a menu of choices. Rather, they are framed in stark terms to highlight very different policy approaches. Each option includes a set of criticisms against it. These are designed to help you think carefully about the risks and trade-offs of each.

After you have had a chance to consider each of the options presented, we encourage you to articulate your own considered judgment on this issue. You may want to borrow heavily from one of the options presented, combine ideas from several, or take a new approach altogether. As you frame your "Option 5," think about the following questions:

- What U.S. interests are at stake in this issue?
- What is the history of U.S. relations with North Korea?
- What is motivating North Korea to take this path?
- How pressing is the issue of North Korea compared to other security priorities?
- How does the war on terrorism fit into discussion about this issue?
- How does our relationship with China, South Korea, and Japan fit into this issue?
- What steps should the United States take in the coming weeks and months?
- What should our long-term goals be?
- What values are important to you?
- What are the pros and cons of this option?

Option 1: Launch a Preemptive Military Strike

The security of the United States is in jeopardy as long as this regime in North Korea is in power. In order to eliminate the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, we must act quickly and decisively. A speedy, surgical attack on nuclear weapons development sites will destroy North Korea's ability to make nuclear bombs, initiate the downfall of Kim Jong-Il's regime, and send a clear message that the United States will not accept nuclear proliferation. Waiting much longer before taking action will ensure that North Korea will have at least one nuclear bomb that it could use against its neighbors, if not against the United States. Weapons-grade fissile material is also easy to

transport. Once North Korea has what it feels is enough to gain leverage, it could begin to sell its nuclear power to whomever it wants. If we choose to negotiate with the North Koreans, it will give them time and we will never know how much weapons-grade nuclear material was squirreled away in the interim. Therefore, we will never be able to remove North Korea from the list of countries possessing nuclear weapons. This uncertainty could compel Japan or Taiwan to develop their own nuclear weapons program as a deterrent. Nuclear proliferation in Asia could, in turn, set off an arms race that could go world-wide. We must act now to prevent this possibility. Our only option for peace and security in the future is to take military action now.

Goals

Eliminate North Korea's threat of nuclear war by destroying the reactors and processors that are producing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium.

- Communicate to other states that nuclear proliferation is unacceptable.

U.S. Policies

- Use the U.S. military to destroy North Korea's nuclear weapons production facilities.
- Prepare to respond to any North Korean attacks.

Underlying Beliefs

- Military might is the only language Kim Jong Il understands. We should not negotiate with irrational, evil people.
- The molasses-like speed with which the international community can deal with problems such as these will not meet the requirements of the timetable in this case.
- The containment policy in use since 1994 has failed.

Criticisms

- A pre-emptive unilateral attack on North Korea would violate international law.
- To bypass negotiation in favor of plans for military action will only increase North Korea's determination to build a nuclear capability as quickly as possible as a deterrence.
- It is very possible that the North Korean nuclear weapons development facilities are not all above ground. We are sure to miss some of them in a conventional airstrike.

- In response to a military strike North Korea could launch strikes of its own against Japan, China, or South Korea, or our bases in those countries. Such a war could mean the deaths of millions.
- A war could also mean economic disaster resulting from the possible destruction of the Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul stock markets.
- The radiation released from attacks against nuclear weapons facilities could kill thousands and be deadly for years to come.
- In order to prevent North Korean retaliation, the United States may be forced to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Invoking such a threat would put the United States in the position of threatening to kill hundreds of thousands of people.
- Our allies in the region are opposed to military action against North Korea.
- If this pre-emptive military option leads to war, or even widespread destruction, the United States would be blamed. This would heighten resentment of the United States throughout the rest of the world.
- Our presence in the Koreas is already unwanted by many in South Korea. Engaging in a war with their neighbor would destroy an already fragile relationship between the United States and South Korea.

Option 2: Contain and Deter North Korea

North Korea's long-range missiles and their arsenal of weapons of mass destruction are of the utmost concern, but we have no reason to give in to their attempts to blackmail us. We have successfully contained the threat from North Korea for the past fifty years, and we can continue to do so now. North Korea's recent announcement about its nuclear weapons program is part of an attempt to gain international leverage with the United States. North Korea has attempted to provoke us in the past, just as they are doing today by restarting their nuclear weapons program. The people of North Korea are starving; providing aid in return for false promises from the North Koreans only prolongs the existence of a regime that will create another crisis in the future when it needs more assistance. If we make deals now, the North Koreans will only be back later asking for more. Tyrants like Kim Jong Il understand force and power and he will take advantage of what he perceives to be weakness. We cannot afford to appear weak. We have a successful model for dealing with a hostile nuclear power - the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was deterred successfully from using its tens of thousands of nuclear warheads by the threat of massive retaliation from the United States. Today, North Korea has one or two weapons and the ability to begin producing one or two a month, far fewer than the Soviet Union. If our goal is security for the region and the world, the wisest course of action is continued containment of the North Korean danger coupled with the threat of massive retaliation.

Goals

- Contain the threat from North Korea and deter its use of weapons of mass destruction.
- Contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- Protect U.S. interests in the region.

U.S. Policies

- Provide strong U.S. support for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.
- Make it very clear that we will counter with comparable force - alone or with others - any aggressive actions on the part of North Korea.
- Reinvigorate negotiations between North Korea and other states in the region to provide other avenues for revenue and support for North Korea.
- Do not reward North Korea's threatening behavior with aid.

Underlying Beliefs

- Kim Jong Il is a dangerous dictator but he is not insane. He will not use weapons of mass destruction if he faces the risk of complete annihilation.
- The United States plays an essential role in containing and deterring threats to regional security. Peace and security on the Korean peninsula are critical to maintaining stability throughout Asia.
- Tyrannical dictators understand the equations of power and force. Negotiations and deals that reward bad behavior will only produce more problems for the United States in the long run.

Criticisms

- Containment by itself is not enough; if we do not take additional action with North Korea, we or our allies will eventually become targets of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction.
- Nothing short of a military attack can guarantee U.S. security. Unless we destroy their weapons facilities, they will continue to build nuclear weapons.
- Containment of North Korea will not address the underlying problem which is North Korea's fears that its national security is at risk.
- The policy of deterrence (and its potential consequences) is morally repugnant when there are alternatives like diplomacy and negotiation.

- Containment would not facilitate the dialogue between North Korea and South Korea that is desired by most Koreans and other Asians as the best long term guarantor of peace and security on the peninsula.
- Deterrence depends on rationality. Counting on Kim Jong Il to act rationally could be a huge miscalculation with horrific consequences.
- Deterrence may not work. North Korea's weapons could find their way into the hands of terrorists or other states willing to use them.
- Containing North Korea will not do anything for the people of North Korea. Millions are starving and oppressed. It is time for a regime change in North Korea.
- How can we guarantee that other states in the region will join the United States in a substantive way in a campaign to contain North Korea? Why should we bear the bulk of the burden?
- We are unwelcome in South Korea and Asia. Why should we risk American lives or spend our defense dollars for nations whose politicians gain popularity by exploiting public resentment of the United States, but rely on us to protect their countries?

Option 3: Engage North Korea in Negotiations

We must confront the issue of North Korea's weapons with diplomacy. The countries in the region are asking the U.S. to talk directly with the North Koreans. The United States should remain flexible in its negotiation tactics, offering to work with others in the region. The UN Security Council or other international organizations or figures could help mediate discussions. However, it is essential to impress upon the countries surrounding North Korea that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons threatens the countries of the region and their own national interests. We must encourage South Korea, in particular, to see the North as a threat, not simply a wayward relative. If the United States enters into negotiations with the North Koreans, the support the U.S. would receive from its allies in the region would significantly diminish tensions between the United States and its Asian allies. The United States should begin negotiations with North Korea immediately. We should be willing to conduct talks anywhere that North Korea is willing to meet us. We should be willing to engage in diplomatic give-and-take to ensure that North Korea ends its nuclear program. Promoting talks is the best and safest way to halt the growing crisis with North Korea and promote peace and security for the region.

Goals

- End the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in North Korea.

- Engage North Korea in the community of nations in order to remove its motivation to build weapons of mass destruction.
- Promote regional peace and strengthen diplomatic relationships with regional powers.

U.S. Policies

- Impress upon regional powers the severity of the crisis.
- Begin negotiations with North Korea. Offer significant, diplomatic carrots and sticks so that North Koreans recognize the benefits of halting their nuclear weapons program.

Underlying Beliefs

- North Korea does not want to engage in a suicidal war. It simply wants to get the world's attention, be given the aid it was promised by the United States in 1994, and feel secure.
- Negotiation is less expensive than war.
- Negotiation is the logical first step to resolving international problems.

Criticisms

- Initiating talks will be submitting to nuclear blackmail and will weaken the United States in the eyes of the world.
- If we negotiate, small countries will learn that they can get what they want from the United States by using "provocations."
- History has shown that negotiating with North Korea does not work.
- The time it takes to bring all the actors to the table - or even some of them - is too long. In the interim, North Korea may launch nuclear weapons against the United States or others in the region.
- While we negotiate, North Korea could sell its weaponry to terrorists.
- A policy of engagement will suggest to other rogue leaders that the possession of nuclear weapons will not result in strong action from the United States. Such an outcome would surely lead to further security threats to the United States.
- Our presence in the Koreas is unwelcome. Meddling in the affairs of the region will only subject us to further danger.
- Negotiating with North Korea, while simultaneously refusing to do so with Iraq, may be seen as a double standard.

Option 4: Withdraw from Korea

The smartest thing that the United States can do at this point is get off of the Korean Peninsula. Our 37,000 troops - costing us 100 million dollars a

year - are neither wanted there nor necessary to protect our Asian allies or ourselves. South Korea, with its own army of 60,000, has been hosting many anti-American rallies, as have other Asian countries. Our presence on the peninsula is no longer necessary as a military deterrent and we are clearly not welcome. It seems that all our presence on the Korean peninsula only serves to increase anti-American sentiment. Why should we risk American time, money, lives or reputation to protect countries that do not like us or want us there, yet cower and hide behind our might during tense moments, all the while criticizing our decisions? Pulling our troops off of the peninsula will force other Asian countries to accept that they need to stand up to North Korea. North Korea's weapons program is a breach of world security and international treaties. The United States should not be the only country to take a stance against them. The whole world should take collective action. Until others accept some responsibility, we should remove ourselves from the peninsula, lower our profile, and use our time, money, and efforts elsewhere.

Goals

- Eliminate what appears to be a growing pattern of manipulation and threat by the North Korean government.
- Lower our profile on the peninsula and in Asia in general.

U.S. Policies

- Remove American troops from the peninsula.
- Encourage China, Japan, and Russia to play a more significant role in Asian security.

Underlying Beliefs

- North Korea does not want to go to war with the United States. It just wants publicity and attention.
- Our limited military presence in South Korea does not add to either our or South Korea's security. If a real threat emerges, we have bases in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii to protect our interests in Asia.
- Attacking North Korea, or levying stricter sanctions, will only lead to increased resentment toward our country by greatly exacerbating the humanitarian crisis there.

Criticisms

- By withdrawing, the United States would allow North Korea to develop nuclear weapons - a reality that endangers the world and weakens our image in the war on terror.
- By withdrawing from the peninsula, the United States might be seen as walking away from a clear and present danger. Some may see this is a contradictory move as we prepare for a war against Iraq.
- As the world's lone superpower, it is our responsibility to help ensure the safety of smaller countries. South Korea will be rendered nearly defenseless if the United States withdraws.
- If the United States withdraws, any hope of successful North Korean/South Korean dialogue would be undermined, reducing the potential for reconciliation between the two Koreas.
- By ending all aid to North Korea and refusing to discuss a new aid package, the already horrific humanitarian situation in North Korea could be greatly exacerbated, leading to increased starvation and poverty as well as more anti-American sentiment.
- Leaving North Korea's neighbors to fend for themselves may cause them to adopt their own nuclear weapons programs due to feelings of vulnerability.
- The United States must remain engaged around the world if it hopes to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and terror.
- Withdrawing from the peninsula could be perceived by other countries as a sign of U.S. weakness. The message will be: If you just make enough of the right kind of noise the United States will pick up and leave.
- North Korea, with its desperate economic condition, might sell some of its products to anyone who will pay a pretty penny, including terrorists.

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North Korea and Nuclear Weapons - Lesson Plan

Choices curricular resources are designed to be used in an interactive format that engages students in active consideration of historical and current background material and then places them in the role of decision-makers as they explore divergent policy alternatives. Finally, students should be given an opportunity to express their own considered judgments on future policy direction.

Suggested Background Resources

- North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Background Reading This document offers a brief summary of U.S. - North Korean relations from the close of World War II to the present.
- 1994 Agreed Framework The Arms Control Association web site offers a complete text of the 1994 Agreed Framework http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af.asp?print
- North Korea: Nuclear Standoff This PBS site (NewsHour with Jim Lehrer) includes links to a series of background pieces on the subject. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/northkorea/

Considering Alternative Policy Options

The Policy Options presented in this material are not intended as a menu of choices. Rather, they are framed in stark terms to highlight very different policy approaches, the values that underlie them, and the critiques.

Break your class up into five groups. Assign four of the groups a policy option (one for each group). Their task will be to review their assigned option, consider the values that underlie it and its pros and cons, and then develop a short presentation to give to the class. This presentation should make the best possible case for this option. (If your class is large, you may also want to assign some students the role of representatives of other nations. They can be asked to present their views on the options after all of them have been presented.) Assign the remaining group the role of the President and his advisors or of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Their task will be to review each of the options presented in the material and prepare challenging questions to ask of the advocates of each option after their presentation.

Articulating Their Own Views

After all of the groups have presented their assigned options and the President or Senate group has asked questions to clarify the options, give all of the students an opportunity to come to terms with their own views on this issue. What should we do? Have them articulate their own considered judgments on the issue by framing their "Option 5." It may help them to use the questions provided with the options as an organizing tool.

The coming weeks and months will most likely be a time of heightened public debate in the United States. Encourage your students to communicate their views to elected officials and policymakers.

Students can find contact information for the White House at http://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/ and their U.S. Senators and their Representatives at http://thomas.loc.gov/.

AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
- The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and
other technical issues through expert level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint

Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non proliferation regime.

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Robert L. Gallucci

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Ambassador at Large
of the United States of America

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